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Executive Summary
With the Doha Round of World Trade Organiza­
tion [WTO] negotiations at a standstill, substantial 
liberalization of agricultural trade remains elusive. 
One obstacle to progress is that "dirty decoupling" 
of farm subsidies from production decisions in 
developed countries has discredited the construc­
tive reform strategy of reducing the production- 
and trade-distorting effects of farm support pro­
grams. Border measures in the developed world, 
often put in place to accommodate domestic poli­
cies, are also problematic.
The United States has a long history of farm policy 
interventions. The omnibus multiyear farm bills 
provide extensive income and price support to 
farmers of major crops. Protective trade measures 
such as tariff rate quotas [TRQs] are widely used to 
supplement commodity support programs. U.S. 
agricultural policy affects a diverse group of stake­
holders both within the United States and interna­
tionally. These stakeholders usually have very dif­
ferent and sometimes conflicting interests.
U.S. agricultural and trade policies have evolved in 
the past century in response both to the changes 
occurring in agriculture and the economy and to 
budgetary and trade pressures. Yet they have also 
retained many features dating back to the early 
1930s. Critics have long argued that these policies 
are outdated and in many ways detrimental to U.S. 
domestic agriculture and to the world economy. 
There is substantial pressure for additional reforms 
to U.S. agricultural policy, even though the 2002 
Farm Bill is not scheduled to expire until the end of 
2007.
There are no clear rules for undertaking reform, 
however, and it remains uncertain exactly what the 
next farm bill would look like. This analysis pro­
vides some generic options for achieving further 
agricultural policy reform in the United States. 
Possible policy options are offered in three broad 
areas: domestic support, market access, and export 
subsidies. Although these trade and domestic poli­
cies are discussed separately, they should be treated 
as linked and requiring coordinated reform efforts.
There is also the issue of politically feasibility if any 
reform is to occur. To the extent that current 
domestic and trade policies prop up domestic 
prices and generate higher farm incomes, U.S.
farmers and farm groups are loath to support a 
change. Nonetheless, several steps can be envi­
sioned that would improve the prospects for adop­
tion of reform in the United States. Effective 
mechanisms might include an elimination of the 
permanent legislation [to which the periodic farm 
bills are technically amendments] for farm support 
programs in the United States and a new WTO 
agreement on agriculture built on tighter limits on 
U.S. amber box measures as well as commitments 
to greater reductions in tariffs and export subsi­
dies. Past experience suggests that a policy change 
will require substantial support from producers. 
For producers who are net losers, compensation 
will be necessary and should be made lucrative 
enough to bring about the necessary support.
Your assignment is to design a policy reform pack­
age [in terms of domestic support, market access, 
and export subsidies] that is both politically feasible 
in the United States and beneficial for developing 
countries.
Background
O v e rv ie w
With the Doha Round of WTO negotiations at a 
standstill, substantial liberalization of agricultural 
trade remains elusive. One obstacle to progress is 
that "dirty decoupling" in developed countries has 
discredited the constructive reform strategy of 
reducing the production- and trade-distorting 
effects of farm support programs, just as "dirty 
tariffication" has marred the elimination of qualita­
tive trade restrictions in the Uruguay Round and 
left high levels of protection in place.1 Decoupling 
of payments from production decisions is supposed 
to eliminate distorting policy effects. But whenever 
world prices are low, developed-country govern­
ments quickly step in and expand their payments to 
farm producers, making the claim that these pay­
ments are "decoupled"—that is, isolated from pro­
duction decisions—rather suspicious.
1 "Dirty decoupling" and "dirty tariffication" refer to the 
situation where efforts to decouple subsidies from 
farmers' production decisions or to reduce nontariff 
barriers to  trade have actually led to more production- 
contingent subsidies or higher tariff rates.
Beyond subsidies, border measures in the devel­
oped world are also problematic. These border 
measures are often put in place to accommodate 
domestic policies. For example, when a govern­
ment attempts to support the domestic price of an 
importable commodity at a level higher than the 
world market price, it must impose high tariff or 
nontariff barriers to keep foreign producers from 
flooding the market with products at lower world 
market prices and taking advantage of higher 
domestic prices. Or, if a government policy [like 
imposition of price floors) induces more produc­
tion than can be accommodated on the domestic 
market, governments must subsidize exports onto 
world markets. In both cases, governments rely on 
border measures to shift the burden of adjustment 
from the domestic to the world market.
U.S. Form Policy
The United States has a long history of farm policy 
interventions. The omnibus multiyear farm bills 
provide extensive income and price support to 
farmers of major crops. The current farm bill, the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act [FSRIA] of 
2002 (or 2002 Farm Bill), which governs agricul­
tural programs through 2007, was signed into law 
in May 2002.2 Although the 2002 Farm Bill intro­
duces some new policies to the array of agricultural 
commodity programs, in many ways it extends 
provisions of the 1996 farm bill and the ad hoc 
emergency spending bills of 1998-2001. For exam­
ple, the 2002 Farm Bill continues marketing assis­
tance loans, which existed under previous U.S. farm 
law. Production flexibility contract (PFC) payments 
of the 1996 farm bill are replaced by direct pay­
ments. A new countercyclical payment is
2 Permanent legislation for farm support refers to those 
laws that would be in force to authorize various agricul­
tural programs in the absence of all temporary amend­
ments (farm bills). The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 and the Agricultural Act of 1949, as subsequently 
amended, serve as the basic laws authorizing the major 
commodity programs. Technically, each new short-term 
farm bill amends the permanent legislation for a specified 
period. The permanent statutory provisions, as amended 
over the years, dictate how commodity programs can be 
implemented unless steps are taken to amend, suspend, 
or repeal parts of them. The most recent legislation 
modifying the effect of the permanent provisions 
through such actions was the 2002 Farm Bill. As usual, 
some permanent provisions were left unchanged by the 
2002 Farm Bill and therefore still apply to current pro­
grams.
established to provide an improved farm income 
safety net for major crop producers. As in the 
previous farm bills, the heart of the 2002 bill lies 
in commodity support programs. In addition, the 
bill contains provisions on agricultural trade, rural 
development, domestic food assistance, foreign 
food aid, conservation, crop insurance, farm credit, 
forestry, and agricultural research.
The commodity support programs affect producers 
of a wide variety of agricultural commodities. The 
program-covered commodities include wheat, feed 
grains [corn, sorghum, barley, oats), cotton [upland 
and extra-long staple [ELS]), rice, soybeans, other 
oilseeds [sunflower seed, canola, rapeseed,
safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed), milk, peanuts, 
beet and cane sugar, wool, mohair, honey, dry 
peas, lentils, small chickpeas, and tobacco. Alto­
gether, these commodities account for approxi­
mately 40 percent of all farm cash receipts [Becker 
and Womach 2002). Other commodities that nor­
mally receive no direct support include meats, hay, 
poultry, fruits, nuts, vegetables, and nur­
sery/greenhouse products. But even producers of 
these items can be affected indirectly by the com­
modity programs. In addition, provisions in the law 
allow the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA) 
to provide discretionary direct subsidies to non- 
program commodities whenever deemed necessary.
The commodity programs in the 2002 bill are 
diverse, and the types and levels of statutory sup­
port employed vary by commodity. Some are sup­
ported by only one method; others receive their 
support through a combination of program tools. 
Broadly speaking, commodity program supports in 
2002 Farm Bill can be classified into two major 
categories: farm income support and commodity 
price support. Farm income support programs 
make payments to farmers to supplement their 
income without directly supporting commodity 
marketing prices. In the 2002 Farm Bill, this type 
of support includes annual fixed decoupled pay­
ments (direct payments) and countercyclical defi­
ciency payments for grains, cotton, oilseeds, and 
peanuts; countercyclical deficiency payments for 
milk; and nonrecourse marketing loans gains 
(MLGs) and loan deficiency payments (LDPs) for 
grains, cotton, peanuts, oilseeds, wool, mohair, 
honey, dry peas, lentils, and small chickpeas. Com­
modity price support programs affect the price of 
commodities directly by setting minimum prices, 
restricting production or sales, and/or regulating
imports. In the current farm bill, price support 
programs affect four commodities: peanuts and 
tobacco by marketing quotas [which were bought 
out in 2004],3 sugar by marketing allotments and 
import quotas, and milk by surplus purchases.
Farm Program Payments
Subsidy payments to farmers vary across years 
because many program benefits are contingent on 
market prices [all in nominal terms]. Figure 1 shows 
commodity and conservation program payments 
from 1996 to 2006. Total payments to farmers 
have increased since 1998, reaching a record US$23 
billion in calendar year 2005. These payments 
were forecast to decline, however, to about US$18 
billion in calendar year 2006 as prices were 
expected to slightly recover. Under the 1996 Act, 
PFC payments decreased according to a payment 
schedule for major field crops, from a high of 
US$6.4 billion in calendar 1997 to US$4 billion in 
calendar 2001. The 2002 Farm Bill replaced PFC 
payments with fixed direct payments. These pay­
ments, based on historic acreage and yields, are 
considered "decoupled"—that is, not based on cur­
rent production or prices. Direct payments are 
projected at US$5.25 billion annually over the 
remainder of the 2002 Farm Bill.
Low commodity prices led to significant increases 
in LDPs and MLGs in 1998-2001 and again in 
2004-05. The marketing assistance loan program, 
reauthorized in the 2002 Farm Bill, prevents the 
buildup of publicly owned stocks [major field 
crops] by providing alternatives to defaulting on 
commodity loans. LDPs and MLGs provide farmers 
with per-unit revenue insulation when prices are 
low. Ad hoc emergency assistance legislated in 
1998-2001 also played a prominent role when 
prices were low during this period. Instead of 
seeking ad hoc legislation, the new countercyclical 
payments authorized in the 2002 Farm Bill offer a 
certain provision to help stabilize farm revenues. 
Countercyclical payments rose in 2005, again 
reflecting lower commodity prices.
3 The quota buyout is the purchase of marketing quotas 
by the federal government for the purpose of phasing 
out such quotas, thus significantly reducing price distor­
tions and eventually government outlays.
U.S. Agricultural Trade Policy
U.S. agricultural trade policy has historically been 
designed to match domestic farm policy. For 
example, when the rules for the General Agree­
ment on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] were written in 
1947, the United States managed to keep agricul­
tural trade exempt from the general rules prohi­
biting the use of import quotas, provided that 
there were domestic production controls on the 
product in question. In addition, the United States 
insisted that the GATT rules for agriculture allow 
the use of export subsidies since it would be 
impossible to compete in export markets without 
export subsidies when domestic price support pro­
grams had maintained the internal price of the 
product above the world price.
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, 
all the import quotas and export restraints in the 
United States were converted into tariffs, many of 
which were very high. In order to ensure some 
market access for agricultural products, the United 
States established a tariff rate quota [TRQ] system 
that covered some 24 percent of agricultural tariff 
lines. For most products in the TRQ system, the 
tariff level for in-quota quantities is fairly low, aver­
aging about 10 percent. The over-quota tariff levels, 
however, are prohibitively high, with an average of 
52 percent.
In the Uruguay Round a tariff-cutting formula was 
designed to allow countries to protect their sensi­
tive agricultural products. Developed countries 
were required to reduce tariffs by an average 36 
percent with a minimum cut of 15 percent on each 
tariff between 1995 and 2000. As a result of the 
recent round of tariff cuts, U.S. bound tariffs on 
most agricultural products are relatively low, aver­
aging about 12 percent. This relatively low figure, 
however, masks some high levels of protection for 
a number of products including dairy, sweeteners, 
and tobacco [Figure 2).
Figure 1: Commodity and Conservation Program Payments, 1996-2006
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Source: ERS, USDA 2006a.
Table 1: TRQs in the United States
Average tariff levels f% )__________________ Number of tariff lines
Tariff 
[all lines]
In-quota tariff 
[TRQ lines]
Over-quota
tariff
[TRQ lines]
Tariff-lines 
without TRQs
Tariff-lines 
with in-quota 
tariffs
Tariff-lines 
with over­
quota tariffs
TRQ lines as 
percentage of 
total
12 10 52 1,198 190 182 24
Source: ERS, USDA 2006b.
Figure 2: Average URAA Bound Tariff Rates by Commodity Group
Percent
Within the 46 product categories shown in Figure 
2, individual tariffs exceed the overall average tariff 
rate of 12 percent in 9 categories, of which 7 con­
tain megatariffs [tariffs over 100 percent].4 The 
highest tariffs in the United States are levied on the 
imports of tobacco products and unprocessed 
tobacco. Even though most of the tariffs in the 
two tobacco categories are below 10 percent, the 
averages are inflated by the presence of 4  mega­
tariffs, each equal to 350 percent. Megatariffs are 
also found in dairy products, oilseeds, nuts, and 
sweeteners. All the 24 megatariffs in the United 
States form the over-quota tariff in a TRQ , so that 
only limited market access is being provided for 
these products at the lower in-quota rates.
4 Tariffs are bound rates based on final implementation 
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
[URAA]. In-quota TRQ, over-quota TRQ, and all non- 
TRQ rates were used to calculate simple unweighted 
average tariffs.
The 2002 Farm Bill authorizes a series of programs 
designed to increase exports of U.S. farm products. 
These programs, which are extremely popular with 
U.S. commodity groups and export firms, include 
export credit guarantee programs, market devel­
opment programs, export enhancement programs, 
food aid and development programs, technical 
barriers to trade, and trade-related programs in 
other titles. It is important to note that some of 
the export support programs provide direct subsi­
dies [US$80 million in 1999] that are prohibited by 
W TO  rules. The United States was thus committed 
to reduce them by 36 percent in value and 21 per­
cent in volume from the 1986-1990 base period 
during the five-year implementation period from 
1995 to 2000. The United States is a minor export 
subsidizer, however. In comparison, the EU has 
provided the largest subsidies to exporters, 
amounting to US$5 billion in 1999.
Stakeholders
Domestic Stakeholders
The essential aim of U.S. agricultural support and 
trade policy is to guarantee adequate farm income, 
support high and stable domestic commodity 
prices, and promote foreign trade. Domestic farm 
policy as reflected in the multiyear omnibus farm 
bills is primarily concerned with the methods and 
levels of support that the federal government pro­
vides to agricultural producers. More generally, 
U.S. agricultural policy deals with agricultural busi­
ness, agricultural trade, conservation and environ­
ment, domestic food assistance [primarily food 
stamps) and foreign aid, agricultural credit, rural 
development, agricultural research and education, 
and other programs. Debate over U.S. agricultural 
policy thus involves a diverse group of domestic 
stakeholders. These stakeholders usually have very 
different and sometimes conflicting goals. Table 2 
shows the different types of stakeholders with their 
relevant interests in U.S. agricultural policy. It can 
be argued that the U.S. government is also a 
domestic stakeholder because it has the responsi­
bility of balancing the interests of different groups 
and it has to bear the costs of implementing the 
farm policies.
Within the United States, even though the per­
centage of the farm population and the direct 
contribution of farming to national gross domestic 
product [GDP] have declined over time, the range 
and importance of interest groups concerned with 
agricultural policy are expanding. Historically, 
domestic stakeholders have included farmers of 
different sizes, agribusinesses, consumers, tax­
payers, and other agriculture-related entities. Agri­
cultural policy debates have revolved around issues 
such as better safety nets for farmers [including 
higher commodity prices), lower food prices for 
consumers, and lower agricultural spending for 
taxpayers. In the past two decades, increased 
personal incomes and public awareness of social 
and environmental issues have generated more 
interest in food safety, environmental quality, and 
social welfare and brought about new stakeholders 
such as environmentalists and social advocates. 
Within this diverse set of interest parties, it should 
be noted that consumers and small farmers, 
although apparent stakeholders in U.S. agricultural 
policy, have little or no influence in policy setting. 
Large farmers, farmer organizations, and
agribusinesses have been much more influential in 
crafting U.S. agricultural policies.
International Stakeholders
U.S. agricultural policy also has international stake­
holders. These stakeholders are developed countries 
such as Canada, the EU, and Japan, whose agri­
cultural policies are in many ways affected by the 
U.S. policies; and developing countries and their 
poor farmers who either export to the United 
States or compete with it in the world market.
High tariffs and over-quota TRQ rates for certain 
products, like sugar and dairy products, set trade 
barriers that effectively restrain certain foreign 
exporters from entering the U.S. market, inflicting 
welfare losses for these exporting countries. But for 
nations that enjoy preferential treatment these 
prohibitive tariffs may be beneficial. For instance, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement 
[NAFTA) has made it possible for Mexico to 
export sugar to the United States to benefit from 
the high U.S. prices maintained by the de facto 
import quotas applied to all other potential devel- 
oping-country suppliers.
U.S. domestic subsidies cause more international 
concern than its market access policies. Subsidies 
linked to market prices are considered trade dis­
torting. The inclusion of higher loan rates and new 
countercyclical payments in the 2002 Farm Bill, as 
well as the continuation of price support programs 
for a number of commodities, have caused many 
critics to question the stated U.S. commitment to 
limit trade-distorting subsidies to agreed-upon 
levels. Although spending on production- and 
trade-distorting policies in the United States does 
not breach the its WTO limits, the sheer size of 
farm subsidies provided in the 2002 Farm Bill 
causes concern about the ability of U.S. trade 
negotiators to persuade the EU and other devel­
oped countries to lower their subsidies.5 And with­
out substantial reductions in subsidies in rich coun­
tries, the prospect of a new agreement on agricul­
ture in the Doha Round appears to be slim.
5 According to the most recent WTO notification, the 
total U.S. trade-distorting [amber box) subsidies as 
measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support [AMS) 
amounted to US$14.4 billion in 2001, which is lower than 
the WTO ceiling of US$19.1 billion.
Table 2: Domestic Stakeholders and Their Interests
Stakeholders Interests
Small family farmers
• Limited-resource farmers
• Farming as primary occupation, 
low sales [<US$100,000]
• Farming as primary occupation, 
high sales [US$100,000- 
US$249,999]
• Retirement
• Income support; credit; education
• Price and income support; credit; education
• Price and income support; price stability; credit; education; 
risk management
• Income support not tied to production; higher land values
O ther family farmers
• Large farms [sales $250,000- 
$499,999]
• Very large farms [sales 
$500,000+]
• Higher and more stable prices; freedom from government 
regulations; risk management
• Higher and more stable prices; freedom from government 
regulations; risk management
Agribusiness
• Nonfamily farms
• Processors
• Throughput companies
• Higher and more stable prices; freedom from government 
regulations; risk management
• Adequate high-quality supplies; low input prices; high 
processed product prices; strong export markets
• Adequate consistent-quality supplies; strong export 
markets
Taxpayers
• National
• Regional
• Low program costs; low administration costs
• Higher local tax revenue from increased incomes and 
higher land prices
Consumers • Low food prices; food safety; adequate food supplies; 
variety of food types; healthful food
Environmentalists
• Conservationists
• Water quality advocates
• Wilderness advocates
• Animal rights advocates
• Prevention of soil erosion; preservation of farmland
• Agricultural practices that limit migration of agrichemicals 
from farms to water
• Maintenance of open space
• Humane treatment of animals
Rural communities
• Long-time residents
• New residents
• Tourists
• Maintenance of traditional communities and rural lifestyle; 
employment opportunities; open space preservation; 
viability of rural communities
• Open space; odor control; rural landscapes
• Rural landscapes; recreational/heritage activities
Social welfare advocates
• Civil rights advocates
• Antipoverty advocates
• Agrarians
• Adequate economic opportunities for minorities; 
opportunities for minority farmers
• Provision of minimum income levels for rural residents
• Maintenance of viable small-scale agriculture
Source: ERS, USDA 2006a.
Many believe that the U.S. 2002 Farm Bill, and 
farm bills in general, have a significant, and in most 
cases, damaging impact on the farm sectors and 
national economies of many developing countries. 
High U.S. subsidies induce overproduction, which 
in turn depresses world prices, meaning that poor- 
country farmers earn less for the products they 
sell. Gradually, they are driven out of the world 
market as well as their own local markets, as they 
simply cannot compete with the prices of dumped 
goods, which are sometimes priced even lower than 
production costs [world cotton prices, for example, 
are now well below average production costs]. In 
most developing countries, agriculture remains the 
essential, and sometimes the only, driver for 
economic growth, rural development, and poverty 
alleviation. Dumping highly subsidized agricultural 
commodities into developing countries destroys 
their only opportunity to grow and further 
impoverishes their economies. At the household 
level, lost commodity sales deprive farmers of their 
ability to send their children to schools, to access 
basic public services, to buy medicines, and to feed 
their families. For countries that are heavily 
dependent on commodity exports for foreign 
exchange earnings, dumping can also lead to severe 
trade imbalances and substantial risks of debt crises.
Policy Issues
Budget
All the U.S. domestic farm support payments are 
financed by the Commodity Credit Corporation 
[CCC], a wholly owned government corporation 
chartered in 1933 to stabilize, support, and protect 
farm incomes and prices. In addition to price and 
income support programs, the CCC also provides 
export subsidies and support for certain conserva­
tion programs such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program [CRP], CCC borrows money from the U.S. 
Treasury and repays the borrowing from program 
revenues and congressional appropriations.
The pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit 
and to control agricultural spending necessitates a 
reform of current farm policy. CCC outlays are 
now projected to average over US$20 billion 
annually through fiscal year 2007 [Figure 3], at a 
time of a deepening federal deficits and more 
pressing national priorities. For example, as the U.S. 
population ages, the country will see greater 
demand for budget spending on Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid, which already account for 
more than 40 percent of the total U.S. budget. 
Moreover, the return to large federal deficits 
means that more of the federal budget will be 
allocated to interest payment on national debts.
Figure 3: Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) N et Outlays, 1980-2007
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Trade
The commodity program provisions in the 2002 
Farm Bill have attracted widespread criticism from 
those in the United States and abroad who view 
them as reversing the market-oriented course the 
U.S. Congress had charted for long-term farm 
policy in 1996. These critics argue that the bill per­
petuates outmoded, commodity-oriented policies 
that tie support to the prices of a few major crops 
(Tweenten 2002], With legislated target prices and 
loan rates set well above market prices, U.S. pro­
ducers will continue to overproduce supported 
commodities, distorting market prices and global 
trade and causing trade disputes. The recently 
resolved dispute with Brazil on upland cotton sub­
sidies and unfavorable WTO rulings against the 
United States illustrate the urgency of reform.
Furthermore, the adoption of expanded farm sub­
sidy programs as reflected in the 2002 bill has 
undermined U.S. credibility in world trade negotia­
tions, where the United States has called on other 
countries to reduce their own trade-distorting agri­
cultural subsidies. As part of the URAA, countries 
committed to continue reform. Negotiators have 
already agreed on a framework that commits coun­
tries to reduce domestic support [20 percent over 
a 6-year period for developed countries and 13 per­
cent over 10-year period for developing countries]. 
The political reality, however, appears to be that 
there will be no agreement without further reduc­
tions in subsidies. To level the agricultural playing 
field and gain additional foreign market access, the 
United States will have to reform its current farm 
policy by reducing outlays on trade-distorting 
domestic support programs.
Though less controversial than farm subsidies, high 
tariffs, especially over-quota rates, have also raised 
international concerns. The United States, along 
with the EU and Japan, has a large number of 
TRQs with high over-quota tariffs designed to pre­
vent imports. In many cases these over-quota tariffs 
are megatariffs of greater than 100 percent as 
illustrated earlier. In addition to the several 
hundred tariff lines covered by TRQs, the United 
States maintains a list of sensitive products as 
defined in the Trade Promotion Authority, which 
covers 184 tariff lines. A closer look at the U.S. 
tariff profile shows that there are a large propor­
tion of non—ad valorem tariffs, which are generally
more protective, especially when prices are low.6 
Furthermore, even though the United States has a 
substantial number of zero-tariff lines, there are 
also many tariffs higher than 12 percent. Many of 
the TRQs and high tariff lines apply to agricultural 
products in which developing countries may have a 
comparative advantage. These products include 
sugar, dairy products, beef, tobacco, fruits, and 
vegetables.
Social Equity
The rise in farm incomes may justify a cut in agri­
cultural program spending. According to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture [ERS, USDA 2006a], 
net farm cash income has increased from an aver­
age of US$50 billion per year during the 1990s to 
more than US$80 billion in recent years. Average 
household income for farm operators reached 
US$80,000 in 2005, well above the national aver­
age income of US$45,000 in that year. Today, 
farm poverty is at its lowest level in U.S. history 
owing to the availability of remunerative off-farm 
employment and on-farm gains in labor produc­
tivity. Thus, general safety net programs, such as 
food stamps or Medicaid, may be more helpful in 
reducing farm poverty than traditional commodity 
programs.
Rather than being awarded with regard to need, 
subsidy payments are based on the types of crops 
grown. More than 90 percent of all farm subsidies 
are allocated to farms that produce just a handful 
of agricultural products in the United States. In 
addition, current agricultural policies are designed 
to concentrate farm subsidies among large farms 
and agribusinesses. Larger farms earn higher 
incomes, but they are also the ones who benefit 
more from the farm program payments. In 2004 
the largest 7.5 percent of farms in terms of gross 
receipts [earning over US$250,0 00 annually] 
received 56 percent of all government payments 
[ERS, USDA 2006a], Government assistance pro­
grams have also benefited landowners more than 
growers since these subsidies are capitalized into 
land values, thereby driving up rental rates. In sum, 
the current farm policy achieves little in terms of 
social equity.
6 An ad valorem  tariff is levied as a fixed percentage of 
the value of the commodity imported.
Political Feasibility of Reform
If any reform to the U.S. agricultural policy is to 
take place, there is the issue of politically feasibility. 
To the extent that current domestic and trade poli­
cies prop up domestic prices and generate higher 
farm incomes, farmers and farmer groups are not 
likely to find a change appealing. Because the 
largest farm groups and agribusinesses are the chief 
beneficiaries of agricultural policy, they have both 
the incentives and the resources necessary to invest 
heavily in maintaining current policies and choke 
down efforts to reform. Through representative 
organizations, they have served on federal com­
missions, testified before Congress, and donated 
millions of dollars to federal political candidates. 
Not surprisingly, the House and Senate farm bills 
include many of the provisions that these groups 
support, including massive farm subsidies and price 
supports. Correspondingly, protective trade meas­
ures are put in place to supplement domestic farm 
support. As a result of a strong agricultural lobby, 
policy reform may not occur for the U.S. agricul­
tural sector in general and for some commodities 
in particular, like sugar and dairy products. Farmer 
groups have successfully blocked constructive pro­
posals in recent farm bills and negotiations at the 
Doha Round.
Policy Options
Domestic Support
A number of operational approaches are available 
for reforming domestic support in the United 
States. First, the post-New Deal "cash-out" farm 
payments could be continued and expanded.7 For 
example, shifting to cash-out payments for com­
modities such as sugar and dairy would provide 
gradual and partial reform that would reduce the 
market intrusiveness of current farm programs 
over the long run by offering beneficiaries a con­
tinuous stream of cash compensation payments. 
The benefits of pursuing a cash-out system for 
these commodities would be fewer market distor­
tions, fewer production restraints, and more com­
petitive export pricing. But cash-outs also have 
drawbacks. It is not clear how much cash-out
measures have decoupled farm support from pro­
duction decisions and trade effects. Even when 
decoupled, a cash-out system entails an open-ended 
commitment to support payments. Dirty decoupl­
ing under a cash-out and the ongoing character of 
the subsidization remain obstacles to trade liberali­
zation.
Alternatives to the cash-out approach for ending 
intrusive farm program interventions, or even for 
ending a cash-out itself, can be distinguished based 
on the speed of reform implementation and 
whether or not compensation is provided to bene­
ficiaries of the programs [Table 3], A buyout is a 
quick termination of support entitlements, made 
politically palatable through significant but tempo­
rary compensation up front, in the form of a large 
cash windfall. A squeeze-out is an incremental 
reduction in the market intrusiveness and gener­
osity of farm programs, managed slowly enough to 
avoid triggering a defensive backlash from lobby 
groups representing subsidy-dependent farmers, 
yet significant enough over time to reduce distor­
tions and costs and to inspire voluntary non-par­
ticipation by market-oriented commercial farmers. 
A cutout is a quick termination of all program 
support entitlements without compensation. None 
of these alternatives to a slow compensated cash­
out has proven feasible on a large scale in the 
United States (Orden et al. 1999],
Market Access
The URAA approach to agricultural tariff reduc­
tion kept in place two characteristics that describe 
the current profiles of global agricultural tariffs: [1] 
differences among countries in their average agri­
cultural tariff; and [2] variation, or dispersion, in 
tariff rates across commodities within countries' 
tariff schedules. The average U.S. agricultural tariff 
of 12 percent is relatively low in comparison with 
average agricultural tariffs in Canada [24 percent], 
the EU [21 percent], Japan [33 percent], and 
Norway [152 percent]. Compared with other 
industrialized countries, the United States also has a 
unique tariff dispersion: more than 50 percent of 
its tariffs are extremely low, at 5 percent or less, 
while only a very small share exceed 100 percent 
[Wainio et al. 2001],
7 Orden et al. [1999] define "cash-out" payments as 
taxpayer payments to farmers to replace the support 
programs that previously propped up commodity market 
prices.
Table 3: Alternative Farm Support Reform Strategies
Compensation
Speed of Implementation
Slow Fast
Yes Cash out Buyout
No Squeeze out Cutout
Source: Orden et al. 1999.
Further tariff reforms in the United States can take 
two broad approaches: formula and sectoral ap­
proaches. The formula approach defines some 
general rule that applies to all tariffs, whereas the 
sectoral approach focuses on one commodity or 
commodity group. Within the formula approach, 
there are two types of formulas for targeting the 
level and dispersion of tariffs: linear reductions and 
harmonization. A linear reduction formula reduces 
the average tariff rate by reducing all tariffs pro­
portionately. In contrast, harmonization formulas 
target tariff dispersion through progressively larger 
reduction of higher tariff rates. In practice, many 
of the tariff reduction formulas proposed in past 
trade negotiations have included variants that 
address both tariff levels and tariff dispersion. 
Many combine some overall reduction of the aver­
age rate with harmonization so that all tariffs are 
reduced while the problem of tariff dispersion is 
not worsened.
There is also a need to reform the TRQs in the 
United States, although there is no single best way 
to do so. One reason is that individual TRQs vary 
with respect to the component of the TRQ (under­
quota tariff, quota, or over-quota tariff) that 
restricts trade. For under-fill TRQs, the within- 
quota tariff is the binding constraint, so reducing 
the within-quota tariff is likely to increase market 
access. In contrast, market access will be enhanced 
by lowering the over-quota rate for over-fill TRQs. 
In addition, an infinite expansion of quotas would 
eliminate the quota system, and the TRQ would 
then become a simple tariff regime. In the Doha 
Round, the United States has proposed eliminating 
all in-quota tariffs and enlarging all quotas by 20 
percent.
Export Subsidies
The URAA approached the reform of export sub­
sidies by placing restrictions on both the volume 
and the value of subsidized exports. Targeting both 
components creates effective constraints in times 
of both high and low prices. When prices are low, 
both the value and the volume limits act as con­
straints. These limits help to prevent the disposal of 
excess supply onto export markets, in an effort to 
raise low domestic prices. Value limits become 
more binding as prices fall because the subsidy [the 
difference between the high internal support price 
and the declining world price] becomes larger. 
When world prices are high, the value constraint 
becomes less binding, but the volume constraint 
can still set some limit on export subsidies.
Compared with other developed countries, espe­
cially the EU, the United States has made limited 
use of export subsidies. Consequently, it is pushing 
hard to roll back or eliminate export subsidies in 
the current negotiations. Although direct export 
subsidies are small in the United States, various 
other export support programs exist, many of 
which are controversial. For example, in the recent 
cotton dispute with Brazil, the WTO dispute 
settlement body found the popular export credit 
guarantee programs to have functioned effectively 
as direct export subsidies to cotton exporters, 
because the financial benefits returned by these 
programs failed to cover the programs' long-run 
operating costs. This finding applies not just to 
cotton, but to all commodities that benefit from 
U.S. commodity support programs and receive 
export credit guarantees. As a result, export credit 
guarantees for any recipient commodity are now 
subject to previously scheduled export subsidy 
commitments for that commodity. Since the United 
States has proposed to phase out all direct export 
subsidies, a viable strategy to maintain sufficient
support to agriculture without violating W TO  rules 
is to switch from direct export subsidies to direct 
payments.
Enhancing the Feasibility of Reform
Several steps can be envisioned that would improve 
the prospects for adherence to reform in the 
United States. Domestically, eliminating the perma­
nent legislation for farm support programs will put 
an end to trade-distorting farm support policies. In 
the international arena, a new W TO  agreement on 
agriculture built around tighter limits on U.S. 
amber box measures, as well as higher reduction 
commitments on tariffs and export subsidies, might 
also provide effective enforcement mechanisms.
Consumers can influence the adoption of reform 
to the extent that their demand behavior contri­
butes to declining benefits under old policy regime. 
But experience from past agricultural reforms sug­
gests that a policy change will require substantial 
support from producers. The emergence of such 
support depends on either shrinking benefits for 
producers in the old policy regime or the potential 
expansion of benefits in the new policy regime. 
A ny policy change generates benefits and costs, 
however, and the acceptance or refusal of a reform 
depends on whether affected producers are net 
winners or losers. For producers who are net 
losers, compensation is necessary and should be 
made lucrative enough to bring about support 
from this group.
Assignment
Your assignment is to design a policy reform pack­
age [in terms of domestic support, market access, 
and export subsidies] that is both politically feasible 
in the United States and beneficial for the devel­
oping countries.
Additional Readings
Becker, G., and J. Womach. 2002. The 2002 Farm 
Bill: Overview and status. Report for Congress 
RL31195. Washington, DC: Congressional
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Orden, D., R. Paarlberg, and T. Roe. 1999. Policy 
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prognosis Chicago: University of Chicago 
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